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NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration into the National Airspace System (UAS 
in the NAS) project examines the technical barriers associated with the operation of UAS in 
civil airspace. For UAS, the removal of the pilot from onboard the aircraft has eliminated the 
ability of the ground-based pilot in command (PIC) to use out-the-window visual information 
to make judgements about a potential threat of a loss of well clear with another aircraft. 
NASA’s Phase 1 research supported the development of a Detect and Avoid (DAA) system 
that supports the ground-based pilot’s ability to detect potential traffic conflicts and 
determine a resolution maneuver, but existing display/alerting requirements did not account 
for multiple UAS control (1:N). Demands for increased scalability of UAS in the NAS 
operations are expected to create a need for simultaneous control of UAs, and thus, a new 
DAA HMI design will likely be necessary. Previous research, however, has found performance 
degradations as the number of vehicles under operator control has increased. The purpose of 
the current human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation was to examine the viability of 1:N 
operations with the Phase 1 DAA alerting and guidance. Sixteen UAS pilots flew three 
scenarios with varying number of UAs under their control (1:1, 1:3, 1:5). In addition to their 
supervisory and sensor mission responsibilities, pilots were to utilize the DAA system to 
remain DAA well clear (DWC) during scripted conflicts of mixed severity. Measured response 
times, separation performance, mission task data, and subjective feedback were collected to 
assess how the multi-UAS control configuration impacted pilots’ ability to maintain DAA well 
clear and perform the mission tasks. Overall, the DAA system proved surprisingly adaptive 
to multi-UAS control for preventing losses of DAA well clear (LoDWC). The findings suggest 
that, while multi-UAS operators are able to maintain safe separation (DWC) from other 
traffic, their ability to efficiently perform missions drastically decreases with their number of 
controlled vehicles. Pilot feedback indicated that, for this context, the use of automation 
support tools for completing and managing mission tasks would be appropriate and desired, 
especially for ensuring efficient use of assets. Finally, human-machine interface (HMI) design 
considerations for multi-UAS operations are discussed. 
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I. Nomenclature  
HMD  =  Horizontal Miss Distance 
modTau  = modified Tau 
s  = seconds 
ZTHR  =  vertical threshold 
II. Introduction 
There is increasing demand for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to have routine access to the National Airspace 
System (NAS) for civil and commercial purposes [1]. Current-day policy compels pilots in the cockpit to ‘see and 
avoid’ surrounding aircraft in order to remain ‘well clear’ [2]. To maintain safety of flight with UAS integration into 
the NAS, detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems onboard UAS will be needed to aid remote pilots in effectively maintaining 
‘DAA well clear’ (DWC) from intruder traffic from a ground control station (GCS). In 2018, RTCA Special 
Committee 228 published the first phase of the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA 
systems [3]. The Phase 1 DAA MOPS include a separation criteria for DWC and the minimum display information 
set needed for timely conflict resolution. The DAA display, alerting, and guidance requirements have been a focus 
area for ongoing research. Previous studies have shown that including color-coded conflict alerting and suggestive 
maneuver recommendations along with intruder state information promote desirable pilot acceptability and 
performance with the DAA display [4-6]. Specifically, the alerting and guidance in the Phase 1 MOPS-compliant 
DAA system (detailed later) have reduced losses of DAA well clear (LoDWC) and minimized the severity of DWC 
violations that do occur in previous human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations [7-13].  
 Phase 1 DAA MOPS assumed no more than one vehicle per pilot. In response to the US Office of the Secretary 
Defense’s Roadmap for integrating UAS into the civil airspace [14], numerous studies have sought to “define 
appropriate conditions and requirements under which a single pilot can control multiple UAS simultaneously”, and 
where performance bottlenecks occur. Studies have revealed that multi-UAS control (also referred to as 1:N control, 
where N is the number of vehicles the pilot controls) can considerably increase cognitive workload and decrease 
situation awareness for a single operator, due in large part to the disruptions that occur from switching between 
information sources [15-17]. It was shown in Ref. 18 that operators exhaust all of their working memory capacity 
while processing information from multiple sources, which led to sub-optimal use of the assets under their control.  
Research has found that while increased levels of automation can mitigate the burdens of multi-UAS operations 
[19], there are cases where performance bottlenecks remain even with higher automation and interface improvements 
[20]. Automation has been shown to enable an operator’s ability to fully control a single UAS for tasks related to the 
automation, though not others [21]. Higher levels of autonomy can lead to a loss of situation awareness and 
consequently result in poorer operator performance [22, 23], particularly in instances where automation is found to be 
unreliable [24]. Given that the simultaneous control of greater than one vehicle involves the working memory for 
multiple situations at once, Ref. 25 has proposed the use of sensor management aids for the support of rapidly gaining 
situation awareness when switching tasks and integrated system designs to reduced operator sensor and flight control 
inputs.  
The present study expands on previous research investigating multi-UAS operations by including the DAA task 
as part of the remote pilot’s responsibilities. Of particular interest is identifying potential changes to the Phase 1 DAA 
human-machine interface (HMI) standards that may be required in order to enable the simultaneous control of multiple 
medium-to-large UAS for transit operations. The current experiment also seeks to identify the circumstances in which 
automation would be especially beneficial to the pilot. 
III. Method 
A. Experimental Design                          
 The present study utilized a within-subjects design to evaluate DAA and mission task performance under three 
pilot:UA control conditions: one operator controlling 1 UAS (1:1), one operator controlling 3 UAS (1:3), and one 
operator controlling 5 UAS (1:5). Counterbalanced run orders varied the number of UAS each pilot controlled between 
trials.  
B. Participants 
Fifteen active duty UAS pilots (M = 36 years of age) were recruited for the present study, with the majority of 
their flight experience being in military operations. Pilots had an average of 1,701 hours of unmanned flight experience 
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and 1,292 hours of manned flight experience. A retired air traffic controller (ATC) and two general aviation pilots 
participated as confederates, managing all the background traffic in the experimental sector.  
C. Simulation Environment 
1. Ground Control Station  
 The Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS), developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), served as 
the GCS utilized for this study [26]. The display configuration consisted of three key components over separate 
monitors. The Tactical Situation Display (TSD) as the primary display containing the ownship mission route(s), 
intruder traffic information (e.g., relative altitude, 30-second predictor line, vertical trend), and DAA alerting and 
maneuver guidance over a moving map. The top of the TSD contained a ‘baseball card’ for each unmanned asset (UA) 
under control. The ever-present baseball card included current and commanded aircraft states, a traffic banner with 
active alert status, and DAA maneuver guidance for nearby headings and altitudes (Fig. 1). The monitor above the 
TSD contained the out-the-window, synthetic terrain heads-up display (HUD) that pilots used to complete sensor tasks 
(detailed below). The monitor to the right of the TSD contained the electronic mission checklists, a tote board with 
aircraft state information, and a chat window where pilots responded to scripted messages that probed their situation 
awareness throughout each scenario. The control interface enabled heading and altitude inputs which could be 
executed via the graphical click-and-drag or keypad inputs to a ‘steering window’. Altitude could also be manipulated 
by clicking on up/down arrows (or “spinners”) that would increase/decrease altitudes in 500-foot (ft.) increments. 
Pilots uploaded commands to the aircraft by clicking the “Send” button located within the steering window. Conflicts 
scripted to lose DWC were engaged by researchers in a separate room using the Vigilant Spirit Simulation (VS Sim) 
software. Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS) software generated background traffic designed to emulate a busy 
day in Oakland Center airspace (ZOA 40/41), as informed by a retired center ATC serving as a subject matter expert. 
The GCS employed a generic MQ-9 Reaper model, with each UA under participant control operating at level altitudes 
ranging from 5,000 to 12,000 ft. 
 2. DAA System  
 The multi-level alerting structure and DAA guidance seen in this study was generated by Detect and Avoid 
Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS; [27]). The DAA alerting and guidance was configured to alert 
each ownship aircraft to potential violations of the DWC threshold (as defined in Table 1). All surrounding traffic 
within 5000ft of ownship were displayed on the TSD, with a sensor range filter applied based on their equipage. For 
example, ADS-B equipage had a sensor range of 15 nautical miles (nm) and RADAR had only 8 nm detection.. The 
color-coded symbology was applied to all intruder traffic within sensor range and indicated threat severity, which was 
based on whether pilot action was required to remain DWC. Any increase in intruder threat severity was accompanied 
by an updated aural alert. Only the two most severe threat levels required eventual pilot action. The yellow Corrective 
alert indicated a caution-level DAA threat that requires corrective action to avoid a LoDWC, but allowed enough time 
for pilots to notify ATC of their intentions. The red Warning alert indicated a warning-level DAA threat that required 
immediate action to avoid a LoDWC, with ATC coordination following soon thereafter. 
The DAA maneuver guidance provided pilots with conflict resolution bands that probed surrounding headings and 
altitudes for predicted threat status. The horizontal bands appeared on the inner range ring of the moving map. The 
vertical bands, located on the altitude tape to the right of the TSD, probed altitudes within ±3,000 ft. of ownship. 
DAIDALUS constantly updated the maneuver guidance bands to reflect the most current trajectories, and did not 
account for ownship or intruder intent. The heading and altitude bands were color-coded in correspondence with the 
predicted threat level from the alerting structure. Headings and altitudes with yellow bands were predicted to lead to 
a loss of DWC with an intruder aircraft within 25–55sec. Red banding indicated that a particular heading or altitude 
would lead to a loss of DWC within 25sec or less. Thus, regions with yellow or red banding were to be avoided, as 
maneuvers toward these areas would trigger at least one Corrective or Warning alert, respectively. Safe flight regions 
that would remain well clear with intruders were indicated by the absence of banding. In the event that resolution 
options for remaining DWC were no longer achievable, or a LoDWC had already occurred, the bands would fully 
saturate to red and present regain DWC guidance designed to maximize separation at closest point of approach (CPA) 
[28]. Pilots could only see DAA information for traffic within surveillance range of the UA they were currently 
focused on. Any unfocused ownship aircraft that flew within surveillance range of the focused ownship appeared as 
intruder traffic on the TSD. Alerting symbology was only shown from the perspective of the focused UA; pilots were 
required to manually switch their focus to the relevant UA any time they wanted to view its associated DAA alerting. 
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Table 1. Phase 1 DAA MOPS alerting logic. 
 
D. Procedures 
1. Training  
 After completing demographics and informed consent forms, pilots were briefed on general broad project 
objectives and the run schedule for that day. Pilots were then given hands-on training with the VSCS interface, 
followed by a practice trial to demonstrate proficiency with the DAA system and their mission responsibilities until 
comfortable to proceed. The practice scenarios took place before each 40-minute experimental trial to ensure 
familiarity with each control condition (1:1, 1:3, and 1:5). In order to move on to the experimental run, the participant 
had to successfully resolve multiple conflicts and complete multiple missions. The process was repeated until pilots 
completed three experimental scenarios - one under each pilot-UA configuration. The order of control condition was 
counterbalanced between participants. The primary pilot responsibility under all control conditions was to maintain 
DWC (safety of flight) while complying with mission checklists and airspace restrictions, including sector boundaries 
and a no-fly zone (5 nm radius) surrounding Sonoma County Airport (KSTS) in the lower quadrant of the sector. 
2. DAA Tasks 
 Each scenario contained six scripted DAA conflicts predicted to lose DWC absent any corrective action from the 
test pilot. The nature of the conflicts varied across a number of variables embedded within each scenario: First Alert 
Type (Corrective or Warning), Focus (conflict against a Focused or Unfocused asset), and Event Type (Single or 
Multi-threat). In the single-UAS configuration, pilots were to respond to four Corrective alerts and two Warning alerts. 
This was also the case in the multi-UAS configurations, except half of the DAA threats conflicted against unfocused 
aircraft. For unfocused conflicts, pilots did hear the aural alert (see Table 1) and saw the current alert status in the 
traffic banner below that ownship’s baseball card (Fig. 1). Pilots had to click the traffic banner or the baseball card 
itself to re-focus their traffic display to the ownship in conflict in order to access that aircraft’s steering interface and 
input an avoidance maneuver. As shown in Fig. 1, the baseball card of the focused ownship was larger than the rest. 
Also unique to the multi-UAS scenarios was a multi-intruder event that involved two simultaneous Corrective alerts 
– one against a focused UA and one against an unfocused UA (Fig. 1). 
3. Mission Tasks 
Each scenario launched with the ownship UA(s) loitering over designated starting points (‘safe zones’). Target 
areas of interest (AOIs) for supervisory missions were displayed as flags across the TSD, all equidistant from the 
starting location(s) and one another. There were 18 mission flags to choose from, and pilots were given the freedom 
to decide the order in which they were targeted. Each mission flag had a label that corresponded to an electronic 
mission checklist (e.g., ‘T1’). Pilots were instructed to complete as many missions as possible in the allotted 40 
minutes, while complying with the mission checklists. Strategies for managing UAs and missions were up to the 
individual pilot, though all were asked to coordinate with air traffic control when changing areas of interest or 
maneuvering for traffic. In the event that every mission was completed during the scenario (technically only possible 
with 5 UAS), pilots were to send their UAs to their original safe zones with an indefinite loiter pattern until a researcher 
ended the run. 
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Fig. 1 A view of the baseball cards in the 1:3 control condition during a multi-threat event. Active DAA alert 
status and maneuver guidance are visible as part of the baseball card of the focused (middle) and unfocused 
UA (right). The stopwatch (top) was used to manually track time on task during supervisory missions. 
 
Supervisory missions involved navigating the ownship aircraft to the AOI and maintaining a continuous orbit with 
the appropriate loiter pattern specifications for the assigned amount of time (example in Fig. 2a). Once on target, the 
UA was required to loiter over the area of interest for four or five minutes. It was the pilot’s responsibility to monitor 
the time on target and manage their transitions between missions. The stopwatch loiter timer within each baseball card 
(controlled via button-click) was the primary method of tracking the time spent on each task, and it was manually 
started once the UA entered the pattern. After maintaining the loiter for the requisite period of time, the pilots were 
free to send the vehicle to the next area of interest. In addition to the electronic checklists, pilots were provided with 
paper mission cards that detailed the loiter pattern specifications and simulated task associated with each AOI on the 
map. Pilots were trained to complete the electronic checklists during the scenario, while use of the paper mission cards 
were considered an optional, secondary reference. The final checklist item prompted pilots to mark the mission as 
complete on the TSD by changing the AOI flag to an ‘X’ icon using a drop-down menu. This was intended to help 
prevent duplicate efforts and track pilots’ progress. Chat messages were periodically sent to pilots asking to report the 
number of missions they had completed to that point in the scenario.  
There were also two sensor tasks that pilots were responsible for in each scenario. Sensor tasks were considered 
higher-priority, and were only prompted by scripted chat commands that occurred 10 and 25 minutes into each 
scenario. Pilots did not know when a given sensor surveillance task was going to be issued and were expected to 
transition to the one vehicle in their fleet with the video sensor payload to the designated area as soon as practical. 
Once entering the loiter pattern over the AOI, they had to monitor simulated sensor video on the HUD to search and 
acquire targets of interest, take a photograph of the target once acquired (example in Fig. 2b), and complete the 
appropriate electronic checklist. Targets of interest for sensor missions included: Cattle Survey, Downed Aircraft, Fire 
Monitoring, or Traffic Accident. The AOI location and nature of the sensor tasks were not made known before the 
scripted prompts, but they were always located in the upper quadrant of the sector near the launch point of the only 
camera-equipped UA. Sensor mission checklists also required an additional speed increase while en route to the AOI 
to indicate a heightened sense of urgency. Pilots did not encounter any DAA conflicts during an active sensor task, 
but were still responsible for monitoring time on task for the concurrent supervisory missions (if applicable). After 
complying with the sensor mission checklist, the pilot would inform ‘Mission Control’ in the chat window and proceed 
with their remaining supervisory tasks.  
(a)     (b)  
Fig. 2 Example of supervisory mission card and camera feed during traffic accident sensor mission. 
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IV. Measures 
A.  DAA Task Performance 
1. Aircraft Response Time (Aircraft RT) 
 Refers to the elapsed time, in seconds, from the onset of a Corrective or Warning alert to the first avoidance 
maneuver uploaded to the vehicle. 
2.  Losses of DAA Well Clear (LoDWC)  
 Refers to the percentage of conflicts that penetrated the DWC threshold in each display condition, as well as the 
reason behind each LoDWC instance. 
 
B.  Mission Task Performance 
1. Time Off Course 
 Refers to the amount of time in seconds pilots took to upload their return to the operational flight path after 
deviating for conflict avoidance. 
2. Extra Time on Task 
 Refers to the amount of seconds that UAS spent in orbit past the minimum assigned loiter time for each supervisory 
mission. 
3. Number of Missions Completed 
 Refers to the average number of supervisory missions completed under each UAS configuration. 
V. Results 
One-way repeated measures Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to analyze the impact of pilot:UA 
Control Condition (1:N) on the Aircraft RT, Time Off Course, and Extra Time on Task metrics, utilizing an alpha-
level of 0.05. Descriptive statistics are reported for the LoDWC and Number of Missions Completed metrics. 
 
A.  DAA Task Performance 
1.  Aircraft Response Time 
Overall, there was a main effect of Control Condition on Aircraft RT, which revealed faster responses with 1 UAS 
under control (M = 12.14s, SE = 0.65s) compared to 3 UAS (M = 15.01s, SE = 0.42s) and 5 UAS (M = 15.24s, SE = 
0.76s), F(2, 28) = 9.15, p < .05. However, the significance of this result was modified by interaction effects found 
between two embedded variables: Event Type and Focus, F(1, 14) = 10.67, p < .05 First, there was a main effect of 
Event Type on Aircraft RT, which revealed faster responses to single-threat conflicts (M = 13.40s, SE = 0.53s) 
compared to multi-threat conflicts (M = 22.88s, SE = 1.11s), F(1, 14) = 67.05, p < .05. There was also an overall main 
effect of Focus found on Aircraft RT, where pilots responded faster to Focused conflicts (M = 13.31s, SE = 0.67s) 
compared to Unfocused conflicts (M = 18.92s, SE = 0.78s), F(1,14) = 27.43, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that the significant main effect of Focus only applied to multi-threat events, where pilots were alerted to a focused and 
unfocused conflict simultaneously (Fig. 3). Since conflicts against focused assets were usually treated as the primary 
threat and resolved first, RTs for Unfocused conflicts were nearly doubled when it was the secondary threat (M = 
29.88s, SE = 2.34s) as opposed to the only (single) threat (M = 15.05s, SE = 0.86s). This appears to be the driving 
force behind major differences in Aircraft RT, as no main effect of Focus was found when controlling only for single-
threat events, p > .05. It is important to note that the significant Aircraft RT increase associated with the secondary, 
unfocused conflicts was only reflected in the grand means for the multi-UAS configurations in which all multi-threat 
events occurred. Therefore, subsequent analyses sought to further isolate the effects of Control Condition on Aircraft 
RT by accounting for this disproportionate impact of Event Type. The aforementioned differences in Aircraft RT 
between the single-UAS and multi-UAS configurations indeed stabilized once controlling only for single-threat events 
(i.e., those that appeared in every condition), and no main effect of Control Condition on Aircraft RT was observed, 
p > .05. 
Lastly, there was a main effect of First Alert Type on Aircraft RT, where pilots responded to Warning alerts (M = 
9.99s, SE = 0.31s) significantly faster than Corrective alerts (M = 18.27s, SE = 0.80s), F(1,14) = 87.14, p<.05. This 
remained the case for each control condition, and the number of UAs did not significantly impact responses to 
Corrective and Warning alerts (Fig. 4). Although Corrective RTs were also extended (to a lesser extent) during multi-
threat events, no significant interactions with any other variables were found. 
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(a)  (b)   
Fig. 3 Mean Aircraft RT by Control Condition & Focus for each Event Type (single and multi-threat).  
 
Fig. 4 Mean Aircraft RT by Control Condition & First Alert Type. 
 
2. Losses of DAA Well Clear 
 Pilots avoided a LoDWC with 99% of the scripted conflicts over the entire study (N = 265). The highest LoDWC 
proportion was observed in the 5 UAS configuration (2.1%), followed by the 3 UAS configuration (1%). There were 
zero instances of LoDWC in the single UAS condition (Table 2). A warning-level conflict in the 5 UAS configuration 
was the only LoDWC event attributable to untimely pilot response. The other two LoDWC events involved pilots 
returning to course too soon after the conflict had been resolved, in an attempt to minimize path deviation. 
 
Table 2. Proportion of LoDWC by Control Condition. 
1 UAS 3 UAS 5 UAS 
0/86 (0%) 1/90 (1.1%) 2/89 (2.2%) 
 
B.  Mission Task Performance 
1.  Time Off Course 
There was a main effect of Control Condition on Time Off Course, F(2, 28) = 6.34, p<.05. Pilots spent less 
Time Off Course in the 1 UAS configuration (M = 45.91s, SE = 2.77s) compared to the 3 UAS (M = 60.34s, SE = 
2.60s) & 5 UAS (M = 70.14s, SE = 8.37s) configurations (Fig. 5). No significant differences in Time Off Course 
were found between the 3 UAS and 5 UAS configurations, p > .05. 
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Fig. 5 Mean Time Off Course by Control Condition 
 
2. Extra Time on Task 
There was a main effect of Control Condition on Extra Time on Task: pilots spent less Extra Time on Task in 
the 1 UAS configuration (M = 16.11s, SE= 3.25s) compared to the 3 UAS (M = 76.04s, SE = 13.31s) and 5 UAS 
(M = 213.57s, SE = 33.03s) configurations, F(2,28) = 31.82, p < .05. The difference in Extra Time on Task between 
the 3 UAS and 5 UAS configurations was found to be significant, p < .05. 
 
Fig. 6 Mean Extra Time On Task by Control Condition 
 
3. Number of Missions Completed 
 On average, pilots completed a higher number of supervisory missions per scenario with 5 UAS (M = 12.69) 
compared to 3 UAS (M = 9.31) and 1 UAS (M = 2.94). 
 
Table 3. Average Number of Missions Completed by Control Condition. 
1 UAS 3 UAS 5 UAS 
2.94 9.31 12.69 
 
VI. Discussion 
A. DAA Task Performance 
The goal of the present study was to evaluate pilot performance with a DAA system integrated into a multi-UAS 
control environment. Overall, the results suggest the Phase 1 DAA system conformed favorably to the multi-UAS 
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operations simulated in this study. DAA Task performance was comparable to past DAA studies that implemented 
the single-UAS configuration. The number of UAs pilots controlled did not have a significant impact on pilots’ ability 
to effectively respond to DAA alerts in a timely manner. The slower Aircraft RTs in the multi-UAS conditions can 
most likely be attributed to conflicts against ‘unfocused’ ownship aircraft, which forced pilots to shift control from 
one UA to another. Although pilots in the multi-UAS conditions heard the aural alert and had DAA information 
available in the baseball cards for each aircraft under their control, they still had to switch the TSD’s focus onto the 
conflicted asset in order to see the appropriate threat symbology and respond to it. Re-focusing to a different aircraft 
for conflict resolution extended initial pilot responses to DAA alerts by approximately 2-3 seconds, but this did not 
significantly impact RTs as a whole. However, during multi-intruder events with simultaneous caution-level threats 
against multiple ownships, pilots were significantly slower to respond to the unfocused threat than the focused – likely 
due to pilots consistently finishing their aircraft response to the focused threat first. There were times when the 
participant was not aware of the secondary threat until it elevated to a Warning alert, thereby triggering another aural 
alert. Luckily, the timing threshold for the DAA Warning alert has shown to be adequate for timely response, and this 
remained the case when having to manage multiple UAs. The DAA alerting and guidance was rated as well-
understood, though pilots reported a desire for more distinct aural alerts for multi-threat encounters.  
Aircraft RTs were nearly identical to the those obtained in previous, single UAS control research [10].  Average 
Aircraft RTs in Ref. 10 were 18 seconds to Corrective alerts and 10 seconds to Warning alerts. In the present study, 
the Aircraft RTs in the 1:5 condition were 19 seconds to Corrective alerts and 11 seconds to Warning alerts. The 5 
UAS condition accounted for the only instance of LoDWC where the initial maneuver was not made in time to remain 
DWC, but still yielded LoDWC rates comparable to past 1:1 research [10]. The previous research had a global LoDWC 
proportion of 1%. The highest proportion of LoDWC in the present study was 2% (1:5 condition), followed by 1% 
(1:3 condition) and 0% (1:1 condition), a strong indication that pilots were able to manage DAA conflicts using the 
Phase 1 DAA system under multi-UAS operations.   
 Subjective feedback indicated that pilots were comfortable with the DAA alerting and guidance performance, and 
they were able to prioritize safety of flight when conflicts arose. The DAA information for all ownship aircraft should 
be available to the operator at all times, though, as pilots found the ever-present DAA guidance on the baseball cards 
to be very helpful for deciding where and how to avoid conflicts against unfocused aircraft. This DAA HMI 
consideration is especially important when the traffic display is limited to focusing on one aircraft at a time during 
multi-UAS operations. The objective and subjective results infer the Phase 1 MOPS DAA system remains effective 
at informing timely, appropriate maneuvers for maintaining DWC with multiple assets under control, even without 
interface solutions known to aid in multi-mission management. 
 
B. Mission Task Efficiency 
 While DAA task performance did not suffer during nominal situations, there were observed breakdowns in mission 
task efficiency as the number of controlled UAs increased. Although increased UAs enabled pilots to complete more 
missions overall, it also increased the amount of time they spent deviated from their flight path after a conflict (Time 
Off Course) and caused pilots to continue loitering their UAs over AOIs for much longer than required (extra Time 
on Task). Pilots reported an increase in workload as a function of the number of UAs under their control, with the 5 
UAS configuration consistently cited as workload-intensive. Much like the non-significant RT differences, the 
reduction in mission task efficiency was associated with having to toggle between multiple assets. However, unlike 
with measured response, there was a significant negative impact on Time on Task as their UA load increased from 1 
UAS to 3 UAS and from 3 UAS to 5 UAS. It should be noted that pilots were trained to comply with the mission 
checklists as precisely as possible, including the assigned loiter time. Pilots were moving on to subsequent missions 
within 16 sec of completion when controlling a single UAS. This is, not coincidentally, the approximate average 
amount of time it takes pilots to input an edit and coordinate with ATC, suggesting that they were fully aware of the 
timer in the 1 UA condition. Extra Time on Task increased by nearly a minute when using 3 UAs and by over three 
minutes when using 5 UAS, both statistically significant increases, indicating that pilots did not have the bandwidth 
to closely monitor the timer in those conditions.  
 Additionally, the Multi-UAS configurations resulted in pilots spending significantly more Time Off Course 
following a DAA maneuver compared to the single UAS control condition. A review of screen recordings revealed 
that the extra time off course was caused by pilots temporarily switching their focus to other UAs while the initial UA 
was performing its avoidance maneuver. Eventually, pilots returned focus to that aircraft to send it back to its 
previously assigned route. Unfortunately, the lack of a DAA “clear of conflict” aural alert meant that pilots had to 
either remember to return to that UA on their own or had to notice the removal of the DAA information from that 
UA’s baseball card. No such distractions were possible in the 1:1 configuration. Thus, managing multiple UAs 
significantly delayed inputs that were not cued by alerting. 
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C. Automation Support 
 Interviews with pilots following the study indicated a number of areas where automation would have been 
beneficial during multi-UAS operations. Pilots reported that 3 UAS was about the most they could comfortably 
manage on their own, which was in line with assumptions from past research [29, 35]. Around 70% of pilots indicated 
that they’d be comfortable with automated DAA conflict avoidance for threats requiring immediate action, especially 
during other high-priority events (e.g., ongoing emergency). At a minimum, pilots would have preferred that the traffic 
display automatically shift focus to the aircraft in conflict at the onset of a DAA alert. Pilots also indicated that an 
ideal display would pre-load a maneuver recommendation into the steering interface for severe encounters (i.e., 
management-by-consent), which has been shown to improve response times [30]. While pilots appear to maintain 
DWC with multiple UAS at an acceptable rate under manual control, findings imply that an automatic return-to-course 
function may significantly improve mission task efficiency under multi-UAS conditions. However, the use of 
automation to offload the tasks of human operators is not straightforward. There are obstacles to implementing this 
feature, such as logic for determining the appropriate conflict-free ‘return’ path and allowing proper ATC 
coordination, but it has the potential to reduce the Time Off Course associated with managing additional UAs.  
 Pilots also desired automation for mission management, as they wanted to be able to set up all of their mission 
routes with the desired loiter times in advance. In this study, pilots had to be in the loop for all navigation tasks, which 
included: setting the target AOI, establishing the appropriate loiter specifications, initiating the ‘loiter timer’ and 
setting a new target once the assigned loiter time was achieved. Automating this control loop would have saved the 
extra Time on Task observed in the multi-UAS configurations, and optimized the use of their controlled assets. These 
desires are in line with previous research [19, 25, 31], which suggested that human operators can best manage multiple 
vehicles when they are primarily supervising payload/mission management while automation handles routine 
navigational control tasks. Interface solutions for multiple vehicle control have been proposed to aid a human operator 
in schedule management and decision execution [32] and have shown support for management-by-consent compared 
to management-by-exception [22]. Performance limitations could also be mitigated by a crew configuration (multiple 
operators for multiple vehicles, referred to as ‘M:N’) that enables control handoffs between multiple operators during 
off-nominal events. Past M:N research has supported the usage of plays—i.e., dynamic, human-automation 
collaboration that considers plans, goals, and resources available—for improving operator awareness during task 
switching, though this is highly dependent on the operational environment [31]. Adaptive automation would allow for 
dynamic function allocation, which would help maintain efficiency during various contingencies. Regardless of 
implementation, the delegation of tasks between humans and automation should complement one another [33], as 
tunneling effects can arise when shared tasks overlap [34]. The exact number of UAs that can be supported is largely 
a function of the level of automation support and task load present in a given system. Therefore, the implications of 
multi-UAS operations are context-dependent, and require further examination in a representative environment. 
VII. Conclusion 
 The Phase 1 DAA system conformed remarkably well to the multi UAS environment, as pilots were able to remain 
DWC at rates comparable to 1:1 performance. The full progression of visual/aural DAA alerting and guidance appear 
to get pilots in the loop quickly enough to mitigate drawbacks associated with one operator shifting focus between 
multiple vehicles, such as delayed response time and reduced mission efficiency. Human-autonomy teaming display 
solutions may relieve cognitive load during critical situations, and further research is necessary to explore the 
necessary HMI requirements for automating DAA and/or mission tasks within 1:N and M:N control configurations 
for increased scalability of UAS-NAS operations.  
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